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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4243 
___________ 
 
ULYESSES B. ADAMS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT; PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH 
COURT; PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-05457) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 7, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 10, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Ulyesses Adams appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing his 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and denying his motion for reconsideration.  We have 
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s dismissal order, see Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000), and 
review the denial of the motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, see Max’s 
Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
This case concerns, at bottom, damage to Adams’s house that he alleges was 
caused by the City of Philadelphia’s demolition of a neighboring home.  Adams sued the 
City in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas; that Court ultimately granted summary 
judgment to the City.  Adams then appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, 
which affirmed.  He also filed a document in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Although 
the nature of that filing is unclear, he states that he obtained no relief. 
Dissatisfied with the outcome of these proceedings, Adams instituted a federal 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as defendants the Court of Common Pleas, the 
Commonwealth Court, and the Supreme Court (collectively, “the Pennsylvania Courts”).  
The District Court dismissed Adams’s complaint, concluding that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to review a state-court decision under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see D.C. 
Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923), and that the Pennsylvania Courts were immune from suit under the Eleventh 
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Amendment.  Adams filed a motion for reconsideration, the Court denied the motion, and 
Adams then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.   
We agree in full with the District Court’s resolution of this case.  To the extent 
that Adams contends that the Pennsylvania Courts harmed him through their adjudication 
of his state action, we agree with the District Court that the claim is barred by the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   That doctrine deprives federal courts of subject-matter 
jurisdiction over claims when “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 
‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were 
rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 
to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).  While this doctrine is “narrow,” id. at 
169, it encompasses at least some aspects of Adams’s complaint.  Adams had judgment 
entered against him in state court; he argues that by these rulings, the Pennsylvania 
Courts violated his right to a fair trial; the Pennsylvania Courts’ orders preceded the 
federal action; and he explicitly asked the District Court to overrule the Pennsylvania 
Courts.  Accordingly, this species of claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  
See generally Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003).   
Moreover, to the extent that Adams seeks damages for the underlying harm to his 
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home, the District Court correctly held that the Pennsylvania Courts are entitled to 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  See, e.g., Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 
426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  While states can waive their Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, see Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2002), Pennsylvania 
has not done so, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).  Further, although Congress can 
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of § 1983, 
the federal law under which Adams proceeds.  See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 
(1979).
1
  Accordingly, the District Court correctly dismissed Adams’s claims concerning 
the alleged damage to his home. 
We further discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order denying 
Adams’s request for reconsideration.  A motion for reconsideration is a limited vehicle 
used “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”  
Max’s Seafood, 176 F.3d at 677 (quotation marks omitted).  In his motion, Adams 
presented the same arguments that the District Court had previously rejected; the District 
Court properly refused to allow Adams to relitigate issues that it had already decided.  
See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Finally, we deny Adams’s request to strike the Pennsylvania Courts’ appellate 
                                              
1
 Given the legal failings of Adams’s complaint, we are satisfied that amendment to the complaint would be futile, 
and therefore conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint without providing leave to amend.  
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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brief.  Contrary to Adams’s contention, the Pennsylvania Courts’ brief was timely.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 31(a)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 26(c). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
